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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we summarize the opinion of three renowned economists, 
namely Paul De Grauwe, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, on the Eurozone 
crisis as well as on the Greek case. All three expressed in one way or another 
their reservations about the single currency. On the one hand, De Grauwe and 
Stiglitz highlighted the design failures of the Eurozone, and on the other 
Krugman argued that the creation of the common currency was a terrible 
mistake. In support of their claims we provide evidence of the negative 
consequences of the austerity measures that were implemented by the troika 
on the Greek economy for a period covering 2010-2014. After five years of 
austerity, Greece among others experienced significant deflationary dynamics, 
deep recession, high unemployment rates that are among the highest in 
Europe, and an increase of the percentage of the people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. More specifically, GDP per capita growth shrank on average 
by 5.85 percent in the period 2010-2013 while the unemployment rate 
reached 25.5 percent in 2015. Even more remarkable is the fact that the youth 
unemployment rate reached 52.4 percent in 2014. Finally, 14 percent of the 
population cannot meet its medical needs due to the high cost of treatment. 
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The Greek Dra(ch)ma: 5 Years of Austerity. 
The Three Economists’ View and a Comment 
 
1. Introduction 
 After the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which was characterized 
by many top economists (such as Behravesh, Rogoff and Roubini during 
the special economic forum CERAWeek in 2009 in Houston) as the worst 
since the Great Depression of 1939, the European Union (EU) sovereign 
debt crisis broke out. Eighteen years earlier, in 1992, the Treaty on the 
European Union was signed in Maastricht by the EU ministers of finance 
and foreign affairs. Under this agreement the idea of the single currency 
was introduced and the main principles of economic and monetary 
policy were established. Among others, one key element of the Treaty 
was that the member states should refrain from high levels of public 
deficits [The European Commission (EC), 1992]. However, from the early 
2000s many EU countries that signed the Treaty of Maastricht failed to 
keep their deficit and debt at low levels (see Figures 1 and 2 below). 
In Figures 1 and 2 below, we distinguish the Eurozone countries into five 
different groups depending on the geographical region to which they 
belong. The first group consists of the `Inner Six' countries (Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands), the second 
group of the so-called `PIGS' (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain), the 
third group of the Central European countries (Austria, Slovakia, 
Slovenia), the fourth group of the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania) plus Finland, and the fifth group of the Insular Europe (Cyprus 
and Malta). Figure 1 below shows that government deficits as a share of 
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GDP in the period 2000-2007 were among others quite high for France, 
Germany, Italy and The Netherlands (countries of the Inner Six group) 
and Portugal and Greece (countries of the PIGS group). Data for Greece's 
deficit are available from 2006 and onwards.  
However, the OECD's economic outlook for Greece reported that the 
Greek government balance sheets were suffering from high levels of 
deficit even from the early 1980s. In addition, according to many views 
(although not scientifically proven), a debt-to-GDP ratio could be optimal 
if it is around 60 percent. But why is this ratio so important? Simply 
because the higher the ratio the more difficult it is for the country to 
repay its debts and hence the higher the probability it will be 
downgraded by the rating agencies such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's 
and Fitch. In Figure 2, data report that among the euro area countries 
only Belgium (though with a decreasing trend), Italy from the Inner Six 
group, and Greece and Portugal from the PIGS group, had a debt-to-GDP 
ratio higher than 60 percent. 
Nevertheless, despite these disparities between the countries that 
followed the rules imposed by the Treaty of Maastricht and those that 
faced difficulties in doing so, the common currency seemed to function 
well (from 2002 to early 2008 when the financial crisis began). But the 
weaknesses and the problems for the single currency were to appear 
shortly after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which led to the 
well-known EU sovereign debt crisis for Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
In this paper, we summarize the opinion of three renowned economists 
on the Eurozone crisis as well as on the Greek case, namely Paul De 
Grauwe, Paul Krugman and Joseph Stiglitz, in an alphabetical order. 
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Table 1 below reports some of the notable phrases that all the three 
economists have used to support their hypotheses. 
Krugman (2010) argues that the creation of the common currency was a 
terrible mistake, while according to Stiglitz (2015e), the euro is poorly 
designed, the European Central Bank (ECB) focuses single-mindedly on 
inflation and it is not provided with the adequate tools to address 
unemployment. These weaknesses in the designs of the euro and the 
ECB damage Europe's prospects, and the Greek ones even more. Troika 
used bad models and forecasts and the result of the macro-policies it 
demanded was a deep Greek depression without end, which will 
possibly lead to even greater economic, political and social chaos. The 
cost in human suffering has already been too high. Similar austerity 
programmes and structural reforms imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on the East Asian countries in the late 1990s had 
devastating effects. Greece then might end up as a depleted country, 
one that has sold all its assets and whose bright young people have 
emigrated. The Greek disaster (or tragedy) is a short story, just a few 
paragraphs (and five years) long, and it goes as follows. 
The Boom 
During the period 2000-2008 there was an influx of cheap loans and 
large amounts of capital that created the boom. The Greek government 
for many years borrowed and spent beyond the country's capabilities. 
For example, Goldman Sachs structured irresponsible deals that enabled 
the Greek government at the time of the Maastricht Treaty to skew the 
numbers of its debt. The booming economy experienced high inflation 
rates and increases in unit labour costs and this boom led to large 
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current account deficits. The nominal interest rate (set by ECB) was very 
low and, thus, when inflation rose the low real interest aggravated the 
boom. 
 
The Bust 
When the capital inflows (or ‘the music’ as Krugman puts it) stopped, 
Greece was faced with high costs and prices. Also, as a result of the 
financial crisis, debt to GDP ratios started to increase (Greece's debt was 
117% of its GDP). When the boom turned into a bust, there was a 
massive outflow of liquidity when investors massively sold Greek 
government bonds pushing interest rates to unsustainably high levels. 
Due to a poorly designed euro, money during the crisis flew from the 
weak country's (that is Greece) banks to the strong, leading to 
divergence. The North unwillingly provided funds to Greece but under 
strict macroeconomic and fiscal conditions, even though almost none of 
the surprisingly large amount of money loaned to Greece has actually 
gone there. Instead, it has gone to pay off private sector creditors, 
including German and French banks. 
Instantaneous austerity programmes were applied, ruthlessly cutting 
spending and raising taxes, leading to a deep recession which reduced 
government revenues, and as a result the austerity programmes were 
intensified. At this point, is worth mentioning that although Greece’s 
large deficit was partially due to the financial crisis and the global 
recession which revealed the deep-rooted structural problems of the 
Greek economy, the rapid fiscal consolidation and tightening of the 
budget deficit deliberately threw Greece into a deep recession with long 
standing effects and catastrophic consequences. 
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There was a unilateral absorption of the crisis. That is, a drastic 
reduction in wages and in prices (an internal devaluation), which in turn 
produced a deeper recession. Consequently, deflationary dynamics 
developed, as imposed by the common monetary policy, which plunged 
not only Greece but also the euro area into a double-dip recession. 
Because of the incoming deflation, the debt burden in Greece worsened. 
This resound increase in debt levels, eventually led to unsustainable 
debt to GDP ratios. 
Also, as deflation took its toll on growth and employment the Greek 
government attempted to discipline its debt with more drastic spending 
cuts and tax increases, which further increased the already high 
unemployment rate and led the bond markets to lose confidence and 
`push the situation to the brink'. Therefore, the macro-policies 
demanded by the troika were a built-in destabiliser, which led to 
unacceptable levels of unemployment and ever growing inequality. 
Thus, due to a lack of monetary sovereignty, Greece did not have any 
power to break the cycle of deflation and inflate away part of its debt. 
The toxic combination of drastic fiscal retrenchment with a lack of any 
monetary policy tool (easy money or devaluation) resulted in the Greek 
disaster. As Krugman (2015b) highlights, the Greek governments' 
deficiency (i.e, irresponsible borrowing which reflects irresponsible 
lending) has been repeatedly paid by the Greek citizens at a high cost, 
and the most decisive issue now is to do everything possible to ‘end the 
bleeding’. 
Most importantly, in order to avoid a Grexit, Greece needs deep debt 
restructuring (see also Lagarde's view on the matter in WSJ, 2015). That 
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is, a write-off of a significant portion of its debt, a deal that would 
lengthen the time over which loans have to be paid back, lowering of 
interest rates and exchanging part of the debt for GDP-linked bonds. The 
ECB should act as a lender of last resort and it must provide liquidity 
immediately. Further, the European Investment Bank should play a more 
active role in Greece by restoring the inflationary dynamics. Finally, 
more reasonable budget goals and structural reforms should be 
demanded by Europe (Stiglitz 2010, 2015b, c, d, f). 
A Grexit from the euro could cause the absolute collapse of the Greek 
economy. That is, it could create financial chaos and have catastrophic 
consequences on its banking system. It might also undermine the 
credibility of the euro and impose threats on the global economy 
through contagion risks. An alternative way to exit from the crisis, might 
be moving towards a dual currency circulation. 
However, the authors fear that the collective voice of these three 
renowned economists will be nothing more than a ‘I am the voice of one 
crying in the wilderness’1 where the wilderness (or the desert) is the 
Eurozone. In support of their claims, we provide evidence of the 
negative impacts of the austerity plans on the Greek economy for a 
period covering 2010-2014. Table 2 below presents a brief description of 
the disastrous consequences that the restrictive policies have had on the 
Greek economy and society in the previous five years. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the three economists' view (namely De Grauwe, Krugman and Stiglitz) 
                                                          
1 As it is written in the book of the words of Isaiah the prophet 
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on the European crisis and the Greek issue. Section 3 presents our 
comments, focusing our analysis on the impact that the austerity 
programs have had on the Greek economy and section 4 consists of our 
concluding remarks. 
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2. The Three Economists' View 
2.1 Paul De Grauwe (on the Eurozone crisis) 
Debtors and Creditors 
De Grauwe (2016) based his arguments on three fundamental axes. The 
first supported the idea that the Eurozone crisis contributed towards 
unsustainable government debts that are to cause further trouble the 
euro area (see Figure 2 above). Second, the problematic (and hence 
possibly inefficient) fiscal policies remain at the centre of the 
continuously soft economic expansion of the Eurozone. Third, despite 
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the Institutions' efforts to reform, these reforms were not sufficient to 
address and solve the design failures of the Eurozone. 
De Grauwe focused on how the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
governed. In particular, he distinguishes the Eurozone into two parts, 
namely the countries that belong geographically to the North of Europe 
(e.g., France, Germany, The Netherlands and Austria) and those 
belonging to the South of Europe (e.g., Greece, Portugal and Spain). 
He points out that the Southern European countries and Ireland have 
accumulated current account deficits in the past (see Figure 1 in De 
Grauwe, 2016). As a result, they have become the debtors, and have 
been hit by sudden liquidity stops and have then been forced to beg the 
Northern countries (that is, the creditors who have built up current 
account surpluses) for financial support (see Figure 1 above). The direct 
effect of that was the dominant impact of the creditor countries on the 
debtor ones and on the Eurozone in general. Austerity is the mechanism 
through which the loans that the reckless creditor nations have 
extended to the South in the past will be repaid in the future. 
However, De Grauwe (2016) is a proponent of the `symmetric' view that 
`for every foolish debtor (a nation who took on too much debt) there 
must be a foolish creditor (a nation that extended too much credit)'. 
Therefore, he argues that not only the debtor nations, but the creditor 
nations as well, should share the cost of this adjustment. De Grauwe also 
supports the view that what happens in the case of banks facing the risk 
of losing part of their loan capital as a consequence of the potential 
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bankruptcy of a borrower, could apply in the case of the countries-
creditors, too. 
Relative unit labour costs 
As explained above, the North unwillingly provided funds to the South, 
but under strict macroeconomic and fiscal conditions. This meant that 
the debtor countries were obliged to cut spending and to increase taxes. 
Austerity was the key point for the creditor countries in order to express 
their solidarity to the debtor ones. 
Therefore, that symmetric process, meaning the sharing of 
responsibilities between debtor and creditor countries, never took place. 
On the contrary, De Grauwe (2016) stated that debtor countries were 
indebted to repay in full their loans to the countries-creditors. This 
asymmetric view led to a series of cutting measures, such as drastic 
reductions in wages and in prices on the part of debtor countries, which 
in turn produced deeper recessions. As a result of this `internal 
devaluation' the relative unit labour costs (the unit labour cost of a 
country over the average unit labour cost in the rest of the Eurozone) of 
the debtor countries (that is, of Ireland, Spain, Greece, and to a lesser 
extend of Portugal and Italy) decreased dramatically (see Figure 2 in De 
Grauwe, 2016). In addition, De Grauwe highlighted the fact that these 
internal devaluations were very costly in terms of lost output and 
employment. Consequently, this unilateral absorption of the crisis by the 
debtor countries developed some deflationary dynamics, which plunged 
the euro area into a double-dip recession. 
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Debt ratios 
As a result of the 2008 banking crisis, the government debt to GDP ratios 
of the debtor countries started to increase. According to De Grauwe 
(2016), the austerity induced recession, making things even worse, since 
both the GDP and the government revenues decreased (the latter 
decline led to higher budget deficits and debts) and, in turn, debt to GDP 
ratios increased even more. In fact, the more intense the austerity 
measures were, the more resounding was the increase in debt levels, 
eventually leading to unsustainable debt ratios (see Figure 4 in his 
article, 2015). Thus, all these sacrifices from the Southern countries were 
partially blamed for making things worse. Furthermore, De Grauwe 
provides empirical cross-section evidence for the negative impact of 
austerity (introduced by the IMF as the variable of the fiscal impulse) on 
the cumulative growth during 2009-2012 (see Figure 5, in De Grauwe, 
2016). 
Finally, in a simulation study assuming that nominal growth will be equal 
to the nominal interest rate, and that primary surpluses will be created, 
De Grauwe (2016, Table 1) found that even under these favourable 
macroeconomic conditions it will take a long time (many decades in fact) 
for the indebted nations to halve their debt levels and to achieve 
sustainability.    
Design Failures of the Eurozone  
The third argument that De Grauwe's paper is based on is the design 
failures of the Eurozone and the inadequate attempts to resolve them. 
 
Single interest rate 
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The existence of a common interest rate (fixed by the ECB) among the 
euro area members imposed pressure on the countries in recession, in 
contrast to the growing ones where the interest rate was too low. As 
pointed out by De Grauwe (2016), the single interest rate that the ECB 
imposed on all member countries was too low for Spain, Ireland and 
Greece, whose economies were starting to boom. When inflation also 
rose in these booming countries the low interest rate aggravated the 
boom. Those divergent dynamics led to discrepancies in inflation, 
relative unit labour costs and current accounts (De Grauwe, 2016). The 
booming economies of the South experienced higher levels of inflation 
rates and increases in unit labour costs, which in turn led to large current 
account deficits. On the other side, Northern countries, which financed 
the booms in the Southern countries by credit, accumulated current 
account surpluses. 
 
Lender of last resort 
De Grauwe (2016) argued that the elimination of the lender of last resort 
backing of the member state countries triggered self-fulfilling liquidity 
crises. These crises (which emerged when booms turned into busts) 
were caused by a massive outflow of liquidity when investors lost 
confidence in Greece, Portugal and Spain, and massively sold the 
government bonds of these countries, pushing interest rates to 
unsustainably high levels. Then, these crises turned into solvency crises. 
De Grauwe says: `The governments of the problem countries were 
forced into instantaneous austerity programmes, by cutting spending 
and raising taxes. These programmes led to deep recessions, which in 
turn reduced government revenues even further, forcing these countries 
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to intensify the austerity programmes'. Eventually, this led to a 
deflationary spiral that made the fiscal crisis more intense. 
De Grauwe (2016) defends the theory which implies that despite the fact 
that fundamentals cannot be ignored there is a special role for the 
central bank, which has to provide liquidity in times of market panic. The 
role of national stabiliser was undertaken finally by the ECB after its 
decision to launch of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) on the 
6th of September, 2012. With this political move, the ECB became lender 
of last resort for banks as well as for sovereigns. The beneficial effect of 
the decision can be seen from Figure 5 in De Grauwe (2016), where 
spreads declined drastically after the announcement of the OMT. 
Policy Implications     
De Grauwe argues that although the ECB is the `ultimate guarantor of 
the sovereign debt in the Eurozone' and in this sense has evolved into a 
central bank such as the Federal Reserve, there is no primacy of the 
governments of each of the member states over the central bank. De 
Grauwe (2016) suggests the formation of a Eurozone government that 
will have control over the ECB and will be supported by a European 
Parliament. 
De Grauwe also points out that the EC and the ECB have seen a 
significant increase in their power since the sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone, without a concomitant increase in their accountability (e.g., 
the EC can now force countries to raise taxes and reduce spending, 
without, however, having to bear the political cost of these decisions). 
De Grauwe highlights the fact that both the EC and ECB affect millions of 
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people's welfare with their decisions. Nevertheless, these people are 
unable to express their disagreement with such decisions via democratic 
means such as elections. De Grauwe (2016) concludes by suggesting that 
the Eurozone should direct its efforts towards a fiscal and political union 
where a Eurozone government supported by a European Parliament will 
be dominant over the central bank in times of crisis. 
 
2.2 Paul Krugman (on the Greek issue) 
Numerous times during the EU sovereign debt crisis the Nobel laureate 
economist Paul Krugman expressed his opinion regarding the failure to 
tackle the Greek crisis issue by the Institutions. In this paper, we will 
summarize four of the articles that Krugman wrote in his column in The 
New York Times. 
 
From Problems and Troubles to a Catastrophe 
Even from 2010, when the first signs of the Greek catastrophe that 
would follow in the coming years unfolded, Krugman stated that Greece 
was approaching the zero point. According to Krugman (2010), Greece 
(`a faraway country with an economy roughly the size of greater Miami') 
is paying the price for past fiscal irrationality. Yet, this view is only one 
side of the coin, and is by no means the whole story (Krugman, 2015a). 
Indeed, Greece (that is, its various Governments) for many years 
borrowed and spent in excess of the country's capabilities. Although the 
Greek government was spending beyond its means in the late 2000s, 
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since then it has repeatedly cut public spending and has raised taxes. 
However, although a restriction of the primary deficit should have 
occurred by now, the national account statistics have not improved (see 
Figure 5 below in Section 3). 
Greece's public debt in 2008 was 113 percent of GDP (see: Figure 4 in 
Section 3 and Ali et al., 2010). At this point, it is worth mentioning that 
Greece is one of the Eurozone countries and these high level 
government debts were part of the deflationary dynamics that were 
imposed by the common monetary policy. In any case, the Greek debt 
was at unprecedented levels, yet other countries have previously 
confronted similar financial difficulties without entering a crisis. To 
illustrate this, we will refer to Krugman's (2010) example. In 1946, the 
post World War II United States, similarly to other countries, was faced 
with high levels of government debt (equal to 121 percent of GDP; see 
Ali et al., 2010). In the next decade, the ratio of US debt to GDP fell to 62 
percent, which was the result of both economic growth (GDP increased 
more than 70 percent in the period from 1946 to 1956, see Maddison-
Project, 2013) and inflation. Nevertheless, this seems to be a utopian 
scenario for the Greek economy. With negative GDP growth rates in the 
period 2008-2013 (see Figure 3 below, data provided by the World Bank) 
and participation in a hard currency (euro) that allowed limited space 
and freedom for progressive and bold monetary policies, the future of 
the Greek economy was at stake. 
In Greece, the influx of cheap loans and large amounts of capital into the 
country, as well as it being a member of the Eurozone, boosted inflation. 
When the capital inflows (‘the music’ as Krugman puts it) stopped, 
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Greece was faced with high costs and prices which were significantly 
greater than those of the big European economies. Since prices had to 
come down, Krugman (back in 2010) predicted—correctly so—that 
because of the incoming deflation the debt burden in Greece would 
worsen (see Figures 4 and 8 in Section 3 below) unlike the US one, which 
was partly inflated. 
He also predicted—again correctly—that as deflation took its toll on 
growth and employment (as pointed out by Krugman, even a G7 country 
with its own currency like Japan can be trapped in a deflationary vortex) 
the Greek government would attempt to discipline its debt (indeed 
today Greek debt is up only 6 percent since 2009, partly because it 
received some debt relief in 2012) with drastic spending cuts and tax 
increases, which would further increase the already high unemployment 
rate (see Figures 12-14 below) and would lead the bond markets to lose 
confidence (see Figures 6 and 15 below) and `push the situation to the 
brink' (today the Greek debt is over 170 percent of GDP- and still rising- 
because GDP is down by more than 20 percent; thus austerity probably 
shrinks the economy faster than it reduces debt). Krugman (2010) 
argued that with German support (which unfortunately did not 
materialise) the European countries should have guaranteed Greek debt 
in exchange for an obligation to undertake harsh fiscal measures. 
However, in 2015, one member of the troika, the IMF, reached the 
conclusion unilaterally that Greece's debt cannot be repaid. Krugman 
(2015c) points out that it was Greece's inability, thanks to the euro, to 
offset fiscal austerity with easy money that turned its debt troubles into 
a catastrophe. In Krugman's words: ‘It was the toxic combination of 
austerity (drastic fiscal retrenchment) with hard money that resulted in 
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the Greek disaster’. That is, Greece did not have the choice of 
devaluation or any other monetary policy tool to support its failing 
economy. 
Back in 2010, Krugman also argued that a possible Grexit from the euro 
would have catastrophic consequences on its banking system. According 
to him, the creation of the common currency was a `terrible mistake', 
since Europe did not fulfil the criteria for a prosperous common currency 
nor the appropriate fiscal and banking union in order to prevent or to 
confront crises such as the recent one (see Krugman 2015a). Krugman 
further highlighted the fact that two of the many risks of a Grexit are 
‘financial chaos and of business hobbled both by banking troubles and 
by uncertainty over the legal status of debt’. Accordingly, since 
abandoning the single currency could cause the absolute collapse of the 
economy, the Greek government (which is now begging for a standstill 
on further austerity) has succumbed to creditors' claims for strict 
austerity plans and structural reforms. In Greece, which did not have the 
option of a currency devaluation that would have made its exports more 
competitive and would have broken the cycle of deflation as, for 
example, in Canada in the 1990s2, the failed austerity brought 
depression and the collapse of the Greek economy. So, now, in the 
words of Krugman, ‘we know that even harsher austerity is a dead-end’. 
 According to Krugman (2015a), the fact that the leftist coalition under 
Syriza in Greece has acceded to the troika's (the institutions representing 
creditor interests) ultimatum represents the ‘final abandonment of any 
                                                          
2 In the words of Krugman (2015b): ‘The truth is that Europe's self-styled technocrats are like 
medieval doctors who insisted on bleeding their patients --- and when their treatment made the 
patients sicker, demanded even more bleeding.’ 
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pretence of Greek independence’. Krugman says that ‘the troika officials, 
these supposed technocrats, are In fact fantasists who have disregarded 
everything we know about macroeconomics’3. 
Although many analysts used to claim that the adoption of the euro was 
an irrevocable move, Krugman (2015b) wonders whether a Grexit might 
work, as in the case of Iceland, where the devaluation of 2008-2009 
proved to be extremely successful, or the case of Argentina, which 
abandoned its one-peso-one-dollar policy in the period 2001-2002. After 
all, even in the event that Greece receives generous debt relief, leaving 
the euro might be the only means of escape from the economic 
depression the country has faced for five years now. Krugman (2015b) 
concludes his analysis by saying that the Greek governments' deficiency 
(i.e., irresponsible borrowing which reflects irresponsible lending) has 
been repeatedly paid for by the Greek citizens at a high cost, and that 
the most decisive issue now is to do everything possible to ‘end the 
bleeding’. 
 
 2.3 Joseph E. Stiglitz (on the Greek issue) 
The Austerity Programme  
With the outbreak of the Greek crisis, Stiglitz (2010), in an article in The 
Guardian, castigated the role of the developed countries in Europe 
towards the Greek issue. In particular, while Greece was criticized 
severely for falsifying the figures of the national statistics, this did not 
                                                          
3 Canada in the 1990s, by combining fiscal austerity, drastically reduced interest rates (to encourage 
private spending) and a currency devaluation programme (to promote exports), managed not only to 
slash its debt but to maintain growth and reduce unemployment as well. 
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happen for other countries of Europe when they exceeded the upper 
limit of deficit as a percentage of GDP established by the Treaty of 
Maastricht. According to Stiglitz (2010), the Treaty of Maastricht had 
already been converted into a two-speed Treaty, one for the strong 
European countries and one for the weak ones. Although the financial 
crisis (of 2007-2008) brought to the surface the structural weaknesses of 
the Greek economy, the large deficit of Greece was partially due to that 
financial crisis (Greece, like many other countries, was not responsible 
for causing this global crisis, yet the economy felt the impacts very 
severely). 
After almost five years of austerity experiments on Greece, he revisited 
the issue with six more articles in high volume/traffic newspapers and 
blogs. According to Stiglitz (2015a), the Eurozone appears not to be a 
very democratic project, and the true nature of the ongoing debt dispute 
is not about money or debates around robust economic policies but 
about power (see also De Grauwe, 2015). The program that the troika 
foisted on Greece for the past five years has been characterized by 
Stiglitz as abysmal. 
Moreover, Stiglitz (2015a, 2015c) alludes to the fact that the 
implementation of the austerity program, the EAP economic adjustment 
programme (Greece had the most significant and rapid fiscal 
consolidation among the advanced European economies, ruthlessly 
cutting back on expenditure and raising new revenues) ‘deliberately’ led 
to a depression that had long standing effects and ‘catastrophic 
consequences’ (see Figure 3 for growth and Figures 12-14 for 
unemployment rates), and it is already deeper and more prolonged than 
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the Great Depression in the US. Finally, Stiglitz (2015c) points out that 
without any of these reforms, Greece grew at a faster rate than the EU 
beginning in the mid-1990s until the global crisis (4 percent vs 2 
percent).    
Criticisms 
According to Stiglitz (2015e), weaknesses in the design of the euro and 
the design of the ECB, which is not provided with adequate tools to 
address unemployment, damage Europe's prospects. It appears that the 
countries that decided not to be part of the common currency, such as 
Sweden, seem to be in better condition than those that joined the 
Eurozone. For example, countries like Greece, Portugal and Spain cannot 
change economic policies, no matter how harmful they become. Stiglitz 
argues that the euro is `poorly designed as in a crisis money flows (for 
the case of Greece see Figures 7, 9 and 17 below) from the weak 
country's bank to the strong, leading to divergence' (for the case of 
Greece see Figure 15 below, while for the divergence problem in the 
Eurozone check, among others, Karanasos et al., 2015 and Morana, 
2015). Stiglitz (2015d) alludes to the fact that GDP today is lower by 17 
percent than the level that it would have been had the soft pattern of 
European economic growth continued its course. 
Greece and other Eurozone member countries have turned over their 
monetary sovereignty to the ECB, which focuses single-mindedly on 
inflation. As a result, unemployment rose, and insufficient attention was 
paid to financial stability (Stiglitz, 2015a; see also De Grauwe, 2016). It 
seems that Greece's destiny is not in her own hands. 
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According to Stiglitz (2015a), the troika used bad forecasts and models. 
The troika's demands (e.g., that Greece should achieve a primary budget 
surplus, excluding interest payments, of 3.5 percent of GDP by 2018) 
have been condemned by economists around the world. Among them is 
Stiglitz, who argues that such demands will lead to unsustainable levels 
of debt and a deeper downturn. In his words (2015f), the macro-policies 
demanded by the troika and its incoherent programme will lead to a 
deeper Greek depression without end, unacceptable levels of 
unemployment and ever growing inequality. It is a built-in destabiliser. 
The high unemployment rate will drive down wages and lower Greeks' 
standard of living even more, possibly leading to even greater economic, 
social and political chaos (for the case of Greece see Figure 20 below). 
Actually, the first two have already arrived, and the third one is around 
the corner. 
Furthermore, Stiglitz (2010) argues that although Greece is among the 
poorest of the European family, if Europe had developed a more 
efficient solidarity and stabilisation framework, then budget deficits in 
the periphery of Europe might have been smaller and hence easier to 
manage. For example, in the USA there is a sense of social cohesiveness 
and so when one part of the country has difficulties, federal spending 
can be diverted to help those parts that are in need. Unlike the US 
structural framework, the EU before and even after the introduction of 
the common currency, did not have an overall support mechanism, 
either financial or structural, to protect its economies when they face 
financial constraints. 
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In addition, Europe did not adopt the principle of ‘do no harm’. As 
mentioned by Stiglitz (2010; in his article in the Guardian) the ECB 
announced that it would not accept Greek bonds as collateral and 
assigned the task of the evaluation of the credit-worthiness of Greek 
bonds to the rating agencies (see Figures 23 and 24 below). Additionally, 
announcements made by the EU leaders exacerbated Greece's problem. 
A large part of Greece's deficit is the result of the global recession, which 
revealed the deep-rooted structural problems of the Greek economy. 
However, European leaders' statements have sent the interest rates 
Greece has to pay soaring, making it even more difficult for Greece to 
tame its deficits (Stiglitz, 2010). 
Furthermore, Stiglitz claims that Greece needs debt restructuring. It is an 
oxymoron that the defeated Germany after World War II, that received 
unconditional aid from US with the Marshall Plan, which constituted in 
real terms the largest financial assistance and debt reduction in world 
history, now refuses even to discuss such a scenario in the case of 
Greece (Stiglitz, 2015d). Although some of Greece's debt was 
restructured, it was too little and not done well. When the crisis began, 
Greece's debt was about 117 percent of its GDP (see Figure 4 below). 
Today, after restructuring, after a program allegedly designed to 
increase the sustainability of debt, it stands at 177 percent, (Stiglitz, 
2015c). 
Stiglitz (2015c) brings up the point that Greece's bailout was not a 
bailout of the country but of the Western banks, who did not do 
adequate due diligence. In full agreement with De Grauwe's (2016) 
arguments, he noted that the lenders ‘bear even more responsibility for 
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the current mess than the borrowers’. For example, it is remarkable that 
almost none of the surprisingly large amount of money loaned to Greece 
has actually gone there. According to Stiglitz (2015a, c; see also some 
recent figures published by IMF) 90 percent of it has gone to pay off 
private sector creditors, including German and French banks. As another 
example, Goldman Sachs structured irresponsible deals that enabled the 
Greek government at the time of the Maastricht Treaty to skew the 
numbers of its debt. 
Stiglitz points out that similar austerity programs and structural reforms 
imposed by the IMF on the East Asian countries in the late 1990s had 
devastating effects. In particular, he stated that ‘both before and after 
the crisis in East Asia, and those in Africa and in Latin America (most 
recently, in Argentina), these programs failed, turning downturns into 
recessions, recessions into depressions’, Stiglitz 2015f. A prominent 
example is the case of Indonesia, which surrendered its economic 
sovereignty, where in 1998 the IMF ruined the country's banking system 
(see Stiglitz, 2015f). 
Negative consequences of the programme 
In the last five years, the Greeks have managed to transform a large 
primary deficit into a surplus. This was a great achievement. However, 
the rapid tightening of the budget deficit threw Greece into a deep 
recession, and the cost in human suffering has been extremely high. 
According to Stiglitz's experience, there has been no other intentional 
recession that resulted in such destructive results. There is a 25 percent 
decline in the country's GDP, and Greece's rate of unemployment has 
reached its peak of 25 percent, with youth unemployment rate 
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exceeding 50 percent (see also the analysis in Section 3 and Figures 12-
14 below). 
Moreover, as pointed out by Stiglitz, these types of policies (e.g., tax 
hikes and pension cuts) have done so much to increase inequality in 
many advanced countries. Despite the fact that the IMF has warned of 
the dangers that the high taxation might impose, in Greece the troika 
insisted on imposing high taxes even at low income levels. A mistaken 
tax policy can help destroy an economy. Although the requirement is 
intended to reduce tax evasion, in the case of Greece it will destroy small 
business (Stiglitz, 2015f). 
The aforementioned major negative consequences are some of many of 
the austerity programmes. Most importantly, Stiglitz mentions that 
‘special interests in the rest of Europe and some within Greece itself 
have taken advantage of the troika to push their own interests at the 
expense of ordinary Greek citizens and the country's overall economy’ 
(Stiglitz, 2015f). Stiglitz highlighted the fact that as a result, Greece might 
end up as a depleted country, one that has sold off all of its assets and 
whose bright young people have emigrated. 
What has to be done?  
The solution of the ‘Greek problem’ according to Stiglitz might lie in the 
following points. Stiglitz (2010) claims that Europe should re-examine 
the short-run budgetary targets (meaning more reasonable primary 
budget surplus targets that is the imbalance between government 
revenues and expenditure) it sets for Greece in terms of the structural 
deficit. In particular, more reasonable budget goals, such as a `primary 
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surplus' of 1 percent, and reasonable structural reforms should be 
demanded by Europe. No country can sustain levels of primary surpluses 
as high as 3.5 percent for a long period of time without deepening the 
recession and causing social and political unrest. 
Stiglitz (2015b, c, f) indicates that Greece needs deep debt restructuring, 
that is, a write-off of a significant portion of Greece's debt (estimated to 
be worth close to $300 billion in bailouts), or at least a deal that would 
lengthen the time over which loans have to be paid back. Even the 
current managing director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, is calling for 
deep debt restructuring. 
An alternative scenario of debt restructuring, proposed by Stiglitz 
(2015c, d), is either lowering interest rates or exchanging part of the 
debt for GDP-linked bonds, which would pay more in case Greece 
recovered. Such an exchange lines up the incentives of debtors and 
creditors, unlike the current system, where Germany benefits from the 
weaknesses in Greece (see also De Grauwe, 2016). 
Furthermore, the European Investment Bank should undertake 
countercyclical investments in the country and offset the deflationary 
impacts of the austerity programmes (e.g., the budget cuts). In general, 
it should play a more active role in Greece by restoring the inflationary 
dynamics. The provision of such support might lower interest rates, and 
help the country achieve budgetary balance (Stiglitz, 2010). 
Stiglitz (2015c) also suggests that the ECB should act as a lender of last 
resort and he argues that it must provide liquidity immediately (see also 
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De Grauwe, 2016). That is, it should offer the stimulus money that two 
successive Greek governments have been requesting.  
GREXIT 
In an interview for TIME magazine, Stiglitz (2015b) called attention to 
the fact that there is no way to predict the long-run consequences of 
Greece abandoning the euro. A GREXIT might undermine the credibility 
of the euro and impose threats on the global economy through 
contagion risks. If the Greek economy recovers after abandoning the 
euro, this may trigger intense anti-euro politics. If, on the other hand, 
the Greek economy collapses outside the euro, then there will be a 
failed state on the edge of Europe, and that is when the geopolitics will 
become very ugly, Stiglitz (2015b). 
In an economy which is globalized to such an extent it is difficult to know 
all the linkages, and thus safe predictions related to the connections 
between events and institutions are most probably impossible. For 
example, many countries of Eastern Europe are still heavily dependent 
on Greek banks, and in the case of the bad scenario, that is, those banks 
collapsing, the EU will face the risk of a financial turmoil that could easily 
be transmitted to the rest of the world economy (Stiglitz, 2015d).    
Parallel Currency (and the similarities with Argentina) 
Stiglitz (2015e) points out that an alternative way to exit the crisis might 
be moving towards a dual currency circulation, using both the euro and 
a ‘Greek euro’, a currency that would be tradable only within the 
country's own banking system. 
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Argentina (Campos et al., 2012 and Campos et al., 2015) and others have 
shown how this can be done. In particular, the government would 
recapitalise the banks using the newly issued currency, extend the 
capital controls, limit withdrawals from banks and promote money 
transfers within the banking system from one party to another (Stiglitz, 
2015d). Despite the fact that every country is different, there are some 
astonishing resemblances between the Argentina and Greece. Both 
countries were being choked by austerity as well as experiencing rising 
unemployment, poverty, and immense suffering under the IMF 
programs (Stiglitz, 2015d).     
 
3. A Comment: The Greek Economy after Five Years of Austerity 
The outbreak of the crisis in 2008 found the Greek economy already 
crumbling. Figure 3 below shows the steep decline of GDP per capita 
growth in 2008 (-0.65 percent) after a period (1998-2007) with a benign 
macroeconomic environment, with an average growth rate of +3.38 
percent. For example, the GDP of North Greece and Aegean Islands was 
similar to that of Croatia and Cameroon in 2008 (namely 60,600 and 
23,300 million euros respectively) while in 2012 it was similar to that of 
Slovenia and Equatorial Guinea (around 47,500 and 18,100 million euros 
respectively). It is noteworthy that in 2008 the gross general government 
debt (see Figure 4 below) reached its highest level (112.9 percent of 
GDP) since the restoration of democracy in 1974.  
After the condemnation of Greece by the EC because of 
misrepresentation of its national statistical data, the newly elected 
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socialist government was forced to revise the estimations regarding the 
level of general government deficit (notably Eurostat reports data 
related to government deficit for Greece after 2011 see Figure 5 below) 
from 5 to 7.7 percent for 2008 and from 3.7 (the figure predicted by the 
previous government some months earlier) to 12.5 percent for the year 
2009. Already since October 2009, the 10-year government bond yields 
started to rise (see Figure 6 below). From Figure 5, we can notice that 
when the Greek Prime Minister (PM) George Papandreou called on his 
EU partners and the IMF to provide financial assistance (23rd April 2010), 
the long term government bond yields reached levels around 8 percent 
and after that the rates followed a rising pattern. The economic cavalry 
of Greece had just begun. 
For five years (2010-2015), Greece implemented endless austerity 
measures that had disastrous effects (see Krugman and Stiglitz above) 
on its economy. In this section, we will try to present the consequences 
that the five years of restrictive policies had on the Greek economy and 
on society in general. 
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3.1 Macroeconomic indicators 
Gross domestic product 
After the announcement of the referral to the support mechanism by 
the ex Greek PM George Papandreou and the implementation of strict 
fiscal measures by the subsequent governments, the macroeconomic 
indicators of the Greek economy do not seem to have improved. In 
particular, GDP per capita growth (see Figure 3 above) shrank on 
average by 5.85 percent in the period 2010-2013 and from 21,900 US 
dollars in 2010 to around 18,100 in 2013 (at constant 2005 prices, see 
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World Bank, 2015). In 2014, the Greek economy displayed some signs of 
improvement (the GDP per capita increased from 18,100 in 2013 to 
18,400 US dollars in 2014), though at significantly lower levels than that 
of the pre-crisis period. Similarly, the country's GDP fell from 299.6 
billion US dollars in 2010 to 238.5 billion US dollars in 2014 (World Bank, 
2015). Hence, over a period of four years Greek society's wealth was 
reduced by 20 percent. Stiglitz (2015a) cannot recall any other 
depression that resulted in such a devastating impact as in Greece’s. 
 
Monetary aggregates (M1, M2 and M3) and inflation rates 
Monetary aggregates are very important tools for the ECB. By adjusting 
them, the central bank can control inflation. Too much money in an 
economy could lead to higher inflation and vice versa. Hence, central 
banks often use this macroeconomic tool to promote economic 
expansion and increase GDP growth at the cost of a simultaneous 
increase in the inflation rates. But a problem that arises very often is 
which one of the three measurements (M1, M2, and M3) is the most 
appropriate for the central banks in order to affect key indicators of the 
economy. Mishkin (2009) argued that we do not know exactly which of 
the money supply indicators is the most accurate. Hence, if M1, M2 and 
M3 follow a parallel performance, then we could use one of the three, in 
order to develop the appropriate economic policies and predictions for 
the future. Figure 7 reports the monetary aggregates (M1, M2 and M3) 
for Greece from 2001 to 2015. The data show a downward trend, 
especially for M2 and M3 aggregates [and hence a decrease in deposits 
(M2), which in turn caused a lack of liquidity in the Greek economy and 
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recapitalization issues for the Greek banks] after 2010 and the launch of 
the economic adjustment program (EAP) imposed by the troika. 
Since the level of inflation is directly affected my monetary aggregates, 
the Greek economy faced a decreasing trend of inflation rates after 2010 
and negative ones from 2013 onwards. This sharp drop of inflation rates 
during the period 2010-2015 might be due to three reasons: first, 
because of a reduction in money supply (in Greece a reduction of money 
supply took place, see Figure 7), second, due to lower credit (see Figure 
9 below) and third, because of reduced consumer spending (after 2010 
private consumption fell, see Figure 10 below). In the last three years, 
deflation put pressure on unemployment rates, transforming a recession 
into a depression (see Krugman 2015a). 
 
 
 
  
35 
 
Consumer confidence index 
Figure 11 below reports the level of the trust that consumers have 
towards the Greek economy (European Commission, 2015). The 
importance of this statistic lies in the fact that consumers are more 
willing to spend money since they feel more certain about their financial 
and career prospects. The trend (dashed line) shows that the consumers' 
confidence in Greece after 2010 fell sharply, which had a significantly 
negative impact on private consumption (see Figure 10 above). 
 
 
Unemployment rates 
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The effects of the crisis were even more severe for unemployment rates. 
The harmonised unemployment rate as a percentage of the civilian 
labour force (see Figure 12 below), increased after 2010 and amounted 
to 25.5 percent in 2015, more than doubling after 2010, according to 
Eurostat projections. Hence, despite the measures that the Greek 
government adopted after the proposals of the troika under the first and 
second EAP, Greece shows the highest unemployment rates in the EU, 
according to Eurostat.  
 
Even more remarkable is the youth unemployment rate (the group of 
unemployed persons aged between 15 and 24) for Greece (see Figure 13 
below), reaching 52.4 percent in 2014 and reflecting how difficult it is for 
the young people to find a job. However, many young people are 
studying full-time and are therefore neither working nor looking for a 
job, and so they are not included in the workforce, which is used as the 
denominator for calculating the unemployment rate. For this reason, 
youth unemployment ratios are estimated as well the share of 
unemployed for the whole population. In particular, the youth 
unemployment ratio for the ages between 15 and 24 rose from 9.9 
percent in 2010 to 14.7 percent in 2014 and for the ages from 25 to 29 
years old the unemployment ratio rose from 16.7 percent in 2010 to 
34.9 percent in 2014 (see Figure 14 below). The latter show how difficult 
it is for the young people, the most active population, to find a job in 
Greece. 
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Maastricht criterion interest rates 
Interestingly, despite the fiscal consolidation of the previous years 
(2010-2014) the Greek economy seems to have diverged even more 
from the EMU countries. Maastricht criterion bond yields are long-term 
interest rates, used as a convergence criterion for the EMU, based on 
the Treaty of Maastricht (Eurostat, 2015). Figure 15 below clearly shows 
that after the launch of the first EAP for Greece in 2010, the Greek long-
term interest rate diverged significantly from that of the euro area. 
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Athens stock exchange (ASE), private sector credit flow and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
Stock markets can very often be used as a barometer of future business 
and consumer confidence. In particular, positive stock market returns 
can be interpreted as an indicator of the development of business 
investment as well as a trace of greater consumer expenditure in the 
future. In Figure 16 below, the Athens stock market exchange (ASE) is 
constantly shrinking from 2008 (the outbreak of the financial crisis) and 
onwards (during the 1st, 2nd and 3rd EAP of Greece). The fall of the ASE 
reflects the economic instability and insecurity that was dominant after 
five years of austerity. In addition, Figure 17 reports the level of private 
sector credit flow as a share of GDP from 1995 to 2014. Since the 
financial crisis of 2008, when the credit flow started decreasing, and 
especially after the adoption of the austerity plans by the Greek 
government, credit flow levels reached negative values. This suggested 
that during the period 2010-2014 businesses operated in a very tight 
liquidity environment since credit institutions were extremely unwilling 
to fund them. Similarly, according to the Bank of Greece (2015), foreign 
  
39 
direct investment (in millions of euros) continuously diminished after 
2010 and the launch of the austerity plans imposed by the troika, by 
losing almost 60% of its initial value in 2010 (see Figure 18 below).    
   
 
Healthcare access, poverty risks, suicides and birth rates 
Figure 19 below reports the self-reported unmet needs for medical 
examinations (including all ages and both men and women, as a share of 
total visits). The reason that these needs were not met was that the 
healthcare service was too expensive for them. It is clear that the 
restrictive policies that were employed in Greece after 2010 did not 
leave the health sector unaffected. The percentage of the persons 
 
40 
whose medical needs were not met due to the high cost of treatment 
increased from 8 percent in 2010 to 14 percent in 2014. Hence, the 
citizens’ access to health services was limited further during the period 
2010-2014. Ever more remarkable is the increase in the rate of the 
people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (as a share of the total 
population). From Figure 20, the percentage of the people that face the 
risk of poverty and social exclusion increased from around 28 percent in 
2010 to 36 percent in 2014, demonstrating the serious social 
consequences of the austerity program. As far as the number of suicides 
is concerned, Branas et al. (2015) argued that since the beginning of the 
austerity measures in 2011 Greek society has been faced with an 
increasing number of total suicides, marking the negative (unintended) 
impacts that these policies might have had on the mental health of the 
people. Similarly, birth rates (the average annual number of births 
during a year per 1,000 persons in the population at midyear, see CIA 
World Factbook, 2015) started diminishing even from 2004, though this 
drop became even steeper after the financial crisis of 2008 and in the 
period 2010-2014, the period of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. 
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4. Conclusions 
In this Section we further discuss and summarize our results. Since the 
Greek economy's integration in the EAP in 2010, much has been written 
and said about the necessity and efficiency of these programs. Among 
them are the three economists Paul De Grauwe, Paul Krugman and 
Joseph Stiglitz. 
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De Grauwe argued first that the euro area crisis contributed towards 
unsustainable government debts, second that the ill-designed fiscal 
policies remain at the centre of the continuously weakened economic 
expansion of the zone, and third that despite the Institutions' efforts for 
reforms these were not sufficient to address and solve the design 
failures of the Eurozone. All the parties are responsible for the 
imbalances that existed between the euro area countries, `for every 
foolish debtor there must be a foolish creditor' (De Grauwe, 2016). 
Krugman, with a series of articles, illustrates the incomplete tackling of 
the Greek crisis by the Institutions and that the creation of the euro was 
a `terrible mistake' (see Krugman 2015a). He points out that with 
negative GDP growth rates in the period 2008-2013 and participation in 
a hard currency (euro) that allowed limited space and freedom for 
progressive and bold monetary policies, the future of the Greek 
economy is at stake. Krugman (2010) argues that with German support 
(which unfortunately did not materialise) the European countries should 
have guaranteed Greek debt in exchange for an obligation to undertake 
harsh fiscal measures. According to Krugman (2015a), the fact that the 
leftist coalition under Syriza in Greece has acceded to the troika's (the 
institutions representing creditor interests) ultimatum represents the 
`final abandonment of any pretence of Greek independence'. He says 
that `the troika officials, these supposed technocrats, are in fact 
fantasists who have disregarded everything we know about 
macroeconomics'. Krugman (2015b) wonders whether a Grexit might 
work, as in the case of Argentina, which abandoned its one-peso-one-
dollar policy in the period 2001-2002. 
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Stiglitz (2010) argues that although Greece is among the poorest of the 
European family, if Europe had developed a more efficient solidarity and 
stabilisation framework, then budget deficits in the periphery of Europe 
might have been smaller and hence easier to manage. In addition, 
Europe did not adopt the principle of do ‘no harm’. For example, 
announcements made by the EU leaders exacerbated Greece's problem. 
Stiglitz (2015c) brings up the point that Greece's bailout was not a 
bailout of the country but of the Western banks, who did not do 
adequate due diligence. In full agreement with De Grauwe's (2016) 
arguments, Stiglitz notes that the lenders ‘bear even more responsibility 
for the current mess than the borrowers’. Moreover, despite the fact 
that the IMF has warned of the dangers that the high taxation might 
impose, yet in Greece the troika insisted on imposing high taxes even at 
low income levels. Stiglitz (2015f) points out that although the 
requirement is intended to reduce tax evasion, in the case of Greece it 
will destroy small business. Finally, Stiglitz (2015e) points out that an 
alternative way to exit the crisis might be moving towards a dual 
currency circulation. Argentina and other cases have shown how this can 
be done. Despite the fact that every country is different there are, some 
astonishing resemblances between the two countries. Both were being 
choked by austerity as well as experiencing rising unemployment, 
poverty, and immense suffering, under the IMF programs (Stiglitz, 
2015d). 
In support of their claims, we provide some socioeconomic indicators 
that show the deterioration of the Greek economy and the difficulties 
faced by society during the five years of austerity measures. At the same 
time, since much has been written about the problem of 
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competitiveness of the Greek Economy, the latest ranking lists reveal 
that little has been achieved in this field (see Figure 22 above). In 
particular, after five years of restrictive policies, the position of the 
Greek economy in the global rankings does not seem to have improved 
dramatically. In addition, the credit default swap (CDS) spread at basis 
points is still at high levels (see Figure 23 above), just above the dam of 
two thousand basis points, suggesting that the risk of a credit event is 
too high, which is the cost of insuring against a Greek default. Verifying 
the lack of competitiveness and the high risk of bankruptcy of the Greek 
economy the Big Three rating agencies (namely, Standard & Poor's, 
Moody's and Fitch and the Rating and Investment Information Inc.), 
negatively assessed the creditworthiness of the bonds issued by the 
Greek government (see Figure 24 above) in the period covering 2009-
2015. 
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